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Interpretation, 1980 and 1880
Rachel Sagner Buurma and Laura Heffernan

Nineteenthcentricity
The nineteenth century has played a starring role in the melodrama of methodological innovation that literary critics have staged
throughout the last decade. From new formalism and thing theory to
surface reading and the broader post-critical turn, recent work on
Victorian literature calls forth distinctively new reading practices.
Witness, for example, Franco Moretti’s “distant reading” of nineteenthcentury detective fiction, Sharon Marcus’s “ just reading” of Victorian
romance plots, Eve Sedgwick’s “reparative reading” and her accompanying course on Victorian textures, Elaine Freedgood’s metonymic
reading of the “things” of Victorian realism, and Jacques Rancière’s
realignment of the politics of aesthetics after years of archival work on
nineteenth-century workers’ writings.1
But these critics are not simply bringing new methodologies
back to their comfortable Victorianist homes in order to go on with the
business as usual of making new readings of old texts for a field-specific
audience. Rather, these new methodologies—of great interest to the
discipline of English literature as a whole—borrow from the nineteenth
A bstract: This article reviews recent methodological interventions in the field of
literary study, many of which take nineteenth-century critics, readers, or writers as
models for their less interpretive reading practices. In seeking out nineteenth-century
models for twenty-first-century critical practice, these critics imagine a world in which
English literature never became a discipline. Some see these new methods as formalist,
yet we argue that they actually emerge from historicist self-critique. Specifically, these
contemporary critics view the historicist projects of the 1980s as overly influenced by
disciplinary models of textual interpretation—models that first arose, we show through
our reading of the Jolly Bargemen scene in Charles Dickens’s Great Expectations (1860–
61), in the second half of the nineteenth century. In closing, we look more closely at the
work of a few recent critics who sound out the metonymic, adjacent, and referential
relations between readers, texts, and historical worlds in order sustain historicism’s
power to restore eroded meanings rather than reveal latent ones.
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century itself. No longer just another object of study, the nineteenth
century has come to seem like a bottomless resource for new models of
turning, more literally than literarily, to literary texts. Thus Mary Poovey
seeks a return to Victorian readers’ powers of referential novel reading;
Nicholas Dames admires the way that Victorian reviewers refrain from
interpreting excerpts from novels; Andrew H. Miller imitates the performative abilities of Victorian perfectionists; and Leah Price tracks all that
Victorians did with books when they weren’t reading them. Even Bruno
Latour, whose actor-network theories have recently inspired many
literary critics, has become an honorary Victorianist, taking nineteenthcentury criminologist and social commentator Gabriel Tarde as his
model for tirelessly tracing impermanent social attachments rather than
revealing an objectified “social” (14–16). These critics return to the longabandoned theaters, laboratories, and libraries of the nineteenth
century, picking up the dusty tools of Victorian readers and writers in
order to reinvent disciplinary methodology.
Some commentators, attempting an account of all such new
reading practices, have united them under the flag of formalism. Those
who label these new methods formalist understand their arrival as a
swing of the disciplinary pendulum back to the text after decades of
hegemonic historicism and its supposedly strongest expression, ideology
critique.2 They necessarily wonder what this new emphasis on innocent
reading and deference to the text augurs for the field of Victorian
studies, which was after all quite energized—some might even say
defined—in the 1980s by Foucauldian archaeologies, New Historicism,
and Jameson-style historical materialism. But do these new methodologies really signal the beginning of the end of literary-critical
historicism?
Certainly, if we look at any of these critics individually, their
formalism, with its newly careful attention to how meaning and sociality emerge through the act of reading (Dames’s protocols, Moretti’s
graphs, Poovey’s historical description), may stand out. But taken in
the aggregate, these methodological innovators seem most notable in
their nineteenthcentricity. Their willingness to reconsider their own
reading practices alongside those of Victorian readers, reviewers, ethicists, and playgoers, we argue, is historicist in two ways. First, their
interest in Victorian reading and readers yields new historical knowledge. Marcus’s wide-ranging archives, Moretti’s big data, Freedgood’s
periodical research, Dames’s reviews, and Poovey’s writing about
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finance increase our knowledge of the “period qua period,” as John
Kucich puts it (60). Second, and more importantly, they are historicist
in that their love affair with the nineteenth century sustains an awareness of their own contingent position at the end of a long century of
disciplinarity. Thinking about the nineteenth century as a time of
uneven disciplinary formation, these critics sound alternative futures
for the discipline as it exists today. In what follows, we draw out this
central claim: that such recent work should actually be seen as an effort
toward rewriting our disciplinary history rather than abandoning
disciplinarity. While this might seem to substitute an onanistic history
for the attractively expansive discursive fields opened by the interdisciplinarity of the 1980s, we argue that this momentary contraction may
yet yield a more durable expansion of the things we can know and the
ways we can know them.
1980/1880
One of the crucial characteristics of this new nineteenthcentury-centric work is its relationship to 1980s criticism, especially criticism characteristic of what Kucich calls the decade’s “‘deep reading’
projects: epistemologies of the closet, Foucauldian paranoia about discipline, depth psychology, quests to uncover repressed sexuality” (65). We
have come to view this relationship as one of displacement or antagonism, influenced perhaps by Stephen Best and Sharon Marcus’s introduction to The Way We Read Now (a special issue of Representations). Best
and Marcus reject 1980s historicism as defined by the figure of Fredric
Jameson and the year 1981, when the publication of his The Political
Unconscious popularized Louis Althusser’s “symptomatic reading” in the
academy (Best and Marcus 5). Yet most of the critics we have mentioned
are engaged in a more intimate reworking of the promises and failures
of deep reading projects, including in many cases their own groundbreaking early work. Thus, in Touching Feeling, Sedgwick revisits various
Foucauldian literary critical projects that rely on the repressive hypothesis, including her own Epistemology of the Closet; for her, the reparable
mistake of 1980s Foucauldian literary critical readings was a tendency to
assume—incorrectly—that “even beyond the repressive hypothesis, some
form of prohibition is still the most important thing to understand” (11).
In both Signs Taken for Wonders and his more recent Graphs, Maps, Trees,
Moretti transforms the canon into culture; the latter work, however,
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approaches its much-multiplied objects of study with “distance” rather
than the sociological skepticism characteristic of the former (Graphs 1).
Likewise, D. A. Miller rewrites The Novel and the Police’s virtuosic poststructuralist deep reading in Jane Austen and the Secret of Style; in the
former, narrative omniscience’s panoptic distance from the world of the
novel serves to shore up its covert power, while in the latter, omniscience
becomes a more vexed and tenuous attempt to discard the shaming
particularities of personhood.
In looking back on their earlier work, these critics are not regretting the historicism of their ambitions; rather, they are more likely to see
these earlier works as unduly hampered by inherited or rote interpretive
practices. These critics (along with others who have no earlier projects to
revisit) attempt to move beyond a historicism that they now see as limited
by its use of formalist models of language and literariness—a historicism
that leans heavily on our discipline’s twentieth-century modes of interpretation.3 While historicisms of the past few decades extended the reach of
our disciplinary reading practices by revealing the literary, generic, or
mythological qualities of seemingly realist, referential, or descriptive
language (as Edward Said does for Orientalist knowledge, Roland Barthes
for the realist novel, and Michel Foucault for medical discourse), critics
today are more likely to dial back the discursive turn. As Price points out,
“reading” was the dominant metaphor for interpretation in the 1980s and
1990s, adopted from the field of literary studies by all kinds of disciplines
(How 20–22). In the last ten years, however, this once-ubiquitous gerund
all but disappeared from article titles and conference panels, while critics
like Sedgwick began to express a “disinclination to . . . subsume nonverbal
aspects of reality firmly under the aegis of the linguistic” (6). As Bill
Brown explains in the introduction to A Sense of Things, “However much I
shared the new historicist ‘desire to make contact with the “real,”’ I
wanted the end result to read like a grittier, materialist phenomenology of
everyday life, a result that might somehow arrest language’s wish, as
described by Michel Serres, that the ‘whole world . . . derive from
language’” (3). If methods that read the world as a text once held out the
possibility of coming closer to the textures and feelings and meanings of
the past, they have lately begun to seem formalist and static, a suspension
of history rather than a privileged pathway to it. Far from seeking to
replace earlier historicisms with new-wrought formalisms, these critics
attempt to free 1980s historicism from the constraints of disciplinespecific interpretive gestures and procotols.4
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In other words, as the 1980s become the past, their historicist
projects come to seem continuous with the long arc of disciplinary
history rather than a radical departure from it. Nineteen-eighties historicism’s methods of suspicious surface and depth reading, its reliance on
the drama of secrecy and revelation, and its focus on prohibitive models
of power—these now seem to find their origin in our earliest methods
for deepening our object of study, for making literature opaque, as
Michael Warner puts it. Returning to the 1880s moment when English
literature took its present shape (institutionalized in the MLA’s 1883
formation), Warner relates an anecdote about Radcliffe students who
“stop idly at a hard passage in the text” and ask their philologist professor,
“What does that mean, sir?” His response—“Mean! It means what it
says!”—indicates that he is a dying breed, for English will soon devote
itself to exactly the interpretive question of what a text means (5–6).
Critics today often imagine that such discipline-founding moments
generated an entire twentieth century’s worth of literary-critical interpretive practices that culminated, finally, in 1980s historicisms. No
longer viewed as a time of rupture but one of covert continuity, the 1980s
now harken back to this 1880s moment of formalism, professionalism,
and disciplinarity. Thus Poovey presents 1886 (the year in which Edward
Dowden theorized “a specifically Literary kind of reading” in his Contemporary Review essay “The Interpretation of Literature” [qtd. in Poovey
315]) as the founding moment of the insistence that “the writer’s meaning
is a secret.” And that insistence, she claims, is crucial for a model of interpretive reading that has defined nearly all historicisms of the past decades
(316). Departing from Poovey’s specific 1880s periodization but sharing
her main insight, Dames suggests that the early twentieth-century rise of
professional literary criticism substituted “the virtuosic gesture” (25) of
an interpretive reading for the “unspoken consensus” (15) of collective
reading fostered by the Victorian review’s “protocol of the long extract”
(22). And for Elaine Freedgood it is also in the early twentieth century
that the widespread adoption of the practice of “reflexive, thematic
reading” came to foreclose the metonymic connections between the
objects in Victorian novels and their material existence in the world (7).5
In revisiting disciplinary history, then, these critics also reach
for something outside, before, or beside the discipline, something they
discover in the nineteenth century before the moment of disciplinary
formation.6 Seeing 1980s historicism as overinvested in figures, metaphorical readings, semiotics, and language’s construction of the world,
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they seek the pre-professional nineteenth century in Hyde Park, in the
Grassmarket, and in Covent Garden, or on shipboard, in the bookstalls of Calcutta, and in the watchboxes of the Australian outback.
Among the casual, occasional socializing of these places, they find the
unmetaphorical past of figures (the book, calico curtains, the theater)
and the referential links forged by not-yet-literary genres like the novel.
As we have become disenchanted with professional modes of reading
that seem to have drained the energy from the promising 1980s (which
seemed at the time to provide both a new energy to the profession and
a new justification for our work to the world at large), the nineteenth
century—with its amateurisms, its sincerities, and its realisms—holds a
new attraction.
In the Three Jolly Bargemen
This account of the critical turn to the Victorian could make it
seem naive or nostalgic, as though by giving up the twentieth century we
could simply cast off alienation in all its forms, returning to a cozy Victorian version of Georg Lukács’s classical epic reader (Lukács 29–32) or
Foucault’s premodern historian (Foucault 130–31). And some critics
certainly fall prey to this temptation. But imagining the Victorian era’s
reading practices as very different from, yet adjacent to, our own holds
out a more realistic possibility. It lets us imagine a counterfactual
history—or a submerged tradition—of interpretation uncoupled from
the alienations specific to formalist critical modes.7 It allows the social to
reenter the room where previously the interpreter and her text (literary
or historical) sat alone, regarding one another with jealousy and suspicion. We might think through the implications of these alternative ways
recent critics have approached the nineteenth century by turning to a
Victorian example of how professional interpretation interrupts the cozy
social scene. In chapter 18 of Great Expectations (1860–61), a “strange
gentleman” intrudes on the village public house, the Three Jolly
Bargemen. The gentleman is the lawyer Jaggers, an urban professional
whose mastery of suspicious interpretation will dismantle the “cozy state
of mind” shared by Pip and his fellow villagers as they listen to Mr. Wopsle
read the newspaper’s account of a recent murder:
It was in the fourth year of my apprenticeship to Joe, and it was a Saturday night.
There was a group assembled round the fire at the Three Jolly Bargemen, attentive to Mr. Wopsle as he read the newspaper aloud. Of that group I was one.
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	A highly popular murder had been committed, and Mr. Wopsle was imbrued
in blood to the eyebrows. He gloated over every abhorrent adjective in the description, and identified himself with every witness at the Inquest. He faintly moaned,
“I am done for,” as the victim, and he barbarously bellowed, “I’ll serve you out,” as
the murderer. He gave the medical testimony, in pointed imitation of our local
practitioner; and he piped and shook, as the aged turnpike-keeper who had heard
blows, to an extent so very paralytic as to suggest a doubt regarding the mental
competency of that witness. The coroner, in Mr. Wopsle’s hands, became Timon of
Athens; the beadle, Coriolanus. He enjoyed himself thoroughly, and we all enjoyed
ourselves, and were delightfully comfortable. In this cozy state of mind we came to
the verdict Wilful Murder. (133)

Wopsle’s performance is more than performative: “imbrued in blood
to the eyebrows” by the act of reading about the popular murder, he
seamlessly becomes each character in turn for a sympathetic audience
(in contrast with his later difficulties convincingly impersonating a
single character, Hamlet, in a second-rate urban theater for a decidedly hostile audience). Wopsle’s reading makes the unknown familiar
just as Jaggers, moments later, will make the familiar strange. The
expert medical witness of the newspaper murder becomes the familiar
local practitioner, while the coroner becomes Timon of Athens;
everyone enjoys themselves thoroughly and all are “delightfully
comfortable” together. In transforming a “highly popular” newspaper
trial transcript into a one-man play—one that recalls Dickens’s own
public readings of his novels—Wopsle’s performance connects the trial
to other generically similar works (Timon of Athens, Coriolanus) rather
than imagining it as a text that refers to the world.
This scene of comfort and coziness is disrupted when Pip
becomes “aware of a strange gentleman leaning on the back of the
settle opposite me, looking on” with an “expression of contempt on his
face” as though to suggest that Wopsle has been (by performing a
newspaper’s account of a murder trial) posing as an expert. “‘Well!’
said the stranger to Mr. Wopsle, when the reading was done, ‘you have
settled it all to your own satisfaction, I have no doubt?’” (133–34). At
first, the group unites behind Wopsle with a “confirmatory murmur”
as Wopsle pronounces the verdict at which they have collectively
arrived: “Guilty” (134). Yet as Jaggers begins to cross-examine Wopsle
himself (“Do you know that none of these witnesses have yet been
cross-examined? . . . Now, turn to that paper, and tell me whether it
distinctly states that the prisoner expressly said that his legal advisers
instructed him altogether to reserve his defence?”), the rest of the
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group begins to distrust Wopsle (“We all began to think Mr. Wopsle
full of subterfuge”), viewing him with suspicion (“We all began to
suspect that Mr. Wopsle was not the man we had thought him, and that
he was beginning to be found out”) (134–35). Finally, like an easily led
jury, the group turns against him, condemning what they now suddenly
understand to be his long-plotted and nefarious projects: “We were all
deeply persuaded that the unfortunate Wopsle had gone too far, and
had better stop in his reckless career while there was yet time” (136).
Jaggers’s questioning replaces Wopsle’s unalienated reading
of the newspaper with a routinized professional technique of interrogation that is designed not to bring light, but to cast doubt. In the
shade of Jaggers’s professionalized reading practice, the familiar
Wopsle looks like an insincere and furtive character with a potentially
heterodox past (“You may read the Lord’s Prayer backwards, if you
like—and, perhaps, have done it before to-day”). Just as Jaggers transforms Wopsle into a man with a surface and a depth through the mere
suggestion that there is a difference between them, so too does he
transform the newspaper story into an opaque, interpretable account
(“Look at that paper you hold in your hand. What is it?”) requiring
close attention (“Turn to the paper. No, no, no my friend; not to the
top of the column; you know better than that; to the bottom, to the
bottom”) and exegesis (“Now, follow that passage with your eye, and
tell me whether it distinctly states that the prisoner expressly said that
he was instructed by his legal advisers wholly to reserve his defence?
Come! Do you make that of it?”) (135). Jaggers’s urban, professionalized interpretation fractures the social bonds in the Jolly Bargemen in
this first of many scenes depicting what Dickens labels Jaggers’s “invisible agency” (213). Jaggers disperses the comfortable and cozy “group
assembled” that the Three Jolly Bargemen’s own name brings to mind,
peeling Joe and Pip away from the gathering. When Pip says that “we
three walked out of the Jolly Bargemen, and in a wondering silence
walked home,” we have the sense that the presiding Bargemen, no
longer quite so jolly, have left the building (137).
Like Dickens, contemporary critics have a critique of Jaggers
and his ilk. For if Jaggers can stand as an emblem for the worst sorts of
interrogative reading, in a sense these contemporary critics attempt to
return to the Jolly Bargemen of the moment before Jaggers appears over
the settle. This isn’t to suggest that contemporary critics attempt a return
to an unalienated world of consensus and community. They aren’t
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interested, that is, in reconstituting the liberal public sphere in order to
recapture a Victorian world modeled on Jürgen Habermas’s eighteenthcentury coffeehouses; not for them the Age of Equipoise’s world of
shared values and cultural consensus reflected in a steadily but slowly
increasing sense of democracy. (Nor do they rely on the less idealized
but equally totalizing models of the Panopticon or an emerging
consumer mass culture.) After all, even Dickens doesn’t idealize the
comfortable and cozy group, whose enjoyment of a “highly popular”
metropolitan murder—one served up in mass-printed newspaper
form—ensures that we can hardly read the Jolly Bargemen scene as
conventional pastoral. Yet contemporary critics are newly interested, as
perhaps Dickens was as well, in constructing a relationship between
persons, texts, and world not predicated on a particular type of professionalized interpretation. For both Dickens and these more recent
critics, professional interpretive practice works by opening a gap between
sign and referent, signifier and signified, into which the professional
insinuates herself, only to suggest that she alone can close it.8
Historicism Now
The critics who interest us, by contrast, hold literary and social
things together without first pulling them apart, using one to explain
the other, or taking one as a figure for the other. Their work shuns
homologies between literary text and referential world, instead searching
out metonymic, adjacent, and referential relations between the two. Yet
these critics do something further: in reimagining the relation between
the world (present or past) and the literary text, and in refusing to define
literature in formalist terms, they seek out a new—and admittedly more
contingent—model of literariness. Reimagining literariness as a quality
that is built socially by different groups of people—literary critics, newspaper readers, college students, sailors, former slaves, Jolly Bargees—
these critics reject formalism’s shadowy territory between sign and
referent in favor of a more local and historicized understanding of how
literary meaning, however ephemeral, comes to be. Turning briefly to
work by three very different critics—Elaine Freedgood, David Kurnick,
and Leah Price—will show the different ways critics are revisiting the
Victorian gathering places where lost references and referents are found.
For Freedgood, metonymic reading serves as an alternative to
a reading practice inhabiting the gap between signifier and signified
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that Karl Marx’s model of the commodity fetish opens for the literary
text. Because we have imagined the mid-Victorian era as “fully in the
grip” of commodity fetishism, she suggests, we tend to read the objects
in realist novels as dematerialized ciphers for symbolic relations (7).
But for the earliest readers of Victorian novels, Freedgood argues, the
oppressive social relations involved in the production of things like
tobacco, curtains, and mahogany furniture aren’t so much hidden as
they are unevenly attended to or under-noticed. Following metonymic
chains of meaning thus allows us to trace “as yet unseen connections
between historical knowledge and fictional form” (29). This metonymic
understanding, unlike the commodity fetish, promises a less fixed,
potentially changeable (though certainly not utopian) connection
between the things of the literary text and the contingency of the
social world.
Price considers books not merely as repositories of representations and ideas, but as objects whose circulations trace relationships
between “masters and servants, men and women, stepparents and
orphans” (How 261). Price builds this opposition between the text
(virtual, transcendent, covertly middle-class, bildungsroman-identified)
and the book (material, local, distinction-making, novel of mannersidentified) in order to reinvest literary studies with a new literalness.
By following the book instead of the text—or the life cycle of a copy of
a newspaper “from rich readers to poor readers, and finally from
readers to the grocery, the kitchen, and the privy”—she reveals that
even the field of book history has internalized Victorian realism’s privileging of textuality over materiality (261). Price reduces Victorian
realism from its current “overrepresentation” in book historical scholarship to its proper corner of the Victorian world even as she places the
tome of textual interpretation on the wider shelf of book history.
In similar fashion, Kurnick sets aside readings of theatricality
in the novel that see representations of the stage as metaphors for the
novel’s performative powers of making worlds out of language. Instead,
he examines how the material traces of the Victorian theater and its
embodied, collective audiences persist within the pages of novels. In so
doing, he replaces a metaphorical critical model that opens and relies
upon the crucial gap between signifier and signified with something
more literal. In “Theater Demetaphorized,” the first section of the
introduction to Empty Houses: Theatrical Failure and the Novel, Kurnick
provisionally rejects the metaphorical readings of dramatic concepts
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like “vanity fair,” “inward drama,” “scenic principle,” and “epiphany” in
the work of William Makepeace Thackeray, George Eliot, Henry James,
and James Joyce, seeking instead “to revive a sense of the lost social
referent of such figures” (6). The worldly referent, with its social specificity and particularity, rather than the formalist space between or
within the figure, is the object of Kurnick’s study; rather than dwell on
the second, he lingers chatting with the first.9
All of these critics sustain historicism’s longstanding power to
restore eroded meanings rather than reveal latent ones. Their search
for lost meanings does not simply reproduce past historical moments,
but allows us to see literacies and practices of meaning-making that
were undervalued and under-noticed even in their own time. These
critics neither replicate the historical record nor try to convert its gaps
and absences into meaningful presence. Their special mission—one
designed not to replace or displace other existing critical modes, but
to work “beside” them, to use Sedgwick’s carefully chosen word (Introduction 8)—returns to us a sense of our disciplinary modes of interpretation as man-made, contingent, and weaker than they sometimes
seem. Like Dickens’s Great Expectations, this critical work—perhaps just
now coming into focus—draws energy from its attention to a range of
literacies. If modernist formalism, like William Empson’s “ambiguity,”
seeks to sublimate “alternative reactions to the same piece of language”
as the defining characteristic of the literary itself (1), these critics take
indeterminacy as the ground from which to begin writing.
Swarthmore College
University of North Florida
NOTES
1
See Moretti, Graphs 67–94; Marcus 1–22; Sedgwick, “Paranoid Reading” and
“Victorian Textures”; Freedgood 1–29; and Rancière, Politics 12–46.
2
As the call for papers for this special issue noted, a return to formalism, variously described, has characterized work in and discussions about Victorianist literary
criticism over the past decade, as John Kucich points out in his defense and redescription of Victorianist historicism, “The Unfinished Historicist Project: In Praise of Suspicion.” For other studies of nineteenth-century literature that engage with the idea of a
recent return to formalism, see Loesberg 1–13, Levine, and Rooney. More ephemeral
but no less telling have been recent graduate student conferences, including Columbia
University’s 2011 graduate student conference (with Caroline Levine as keynote
speaker) on “The Politics of Form,” the yearlong theme and graduate conference on
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“Politics, Ethics, and the New Formalisms” hosted by the University of Illinois at
Urbana-Champaign’s British Modernities Group in 2010 (featuring a keynote address
by Marjorie Levinson), and the yearlong “Formalisms” seminar at the Rutgers University Center for Cultural Analysis (2012–13).
3
Thus, for example, Heather Love argues that the “depth” of “depth interpretation” refers not only to “the hidden structures or causes that suspicious critics reveal”
but to an older marriage of close reading and humanism, in which critics seek to
produce “life, richness, warmth, and voice” through their interpretations of texts (388).
Likewise, Price sees twenty-first century book history as limited not by models of
critique or suspicion, but by older models of literary canonicity: “Even when book historians choose objects that stand outside of the literary, the language in which they
describe their own scholarly practices remains parasitic on a literary canon in which
reading gets tirelessly thematized” (37).
Even as English seeks to free its historicist work from discipline-specific
methods of close reading and interpretation, historians have begun to set aside the
tools of textual interpretation that they once borrowed from literary critics. Thus Lynn
Hunt urges historians to “get away from the discursive focus” which has “certainly
dominated [her own] work” and consider that the “world is not just discursively
constructed. It is also built through embodiment, gesture, facial expression, and feelings, that is, through nonlinguistic modes of communication that have their own
logics” (674).
5
Cannon Schmitt’s “Tidal Conrad (Literally),” published after we wrote this
article, offers a slight twist on this formulation. Where others have corrected for our
disciplinary emphasis on the figurative by turning to the literal, Schmitt aims to reconcile the two. He shows, through a “denotative” reading of Heart of Darkness (1899), how
tracing the referentiality of Conrad’s nautical details leads to a deeper reading of that
novel’s self-reflexivity (7). Like other nineteenth-century-centric critics, Schmitt situates himself—via Conrad—just before modernism pursues “higher verisimilitude” and
“self-reflexiveness” as distinct goals requiring separate techniques (26).
6
Such reorientations are not specific to literary study and, indeed, the late nineteenth century saw the formation of multiple disciplines; literature became opaque, but
so too did pipes, top hats, homosexuality, and scientific facts for sociologists, psychoanalysts, and other professional interpreters. Perhaps the first and best example of seeking
the nineteenth-century origins of late twentieth-century forms of suspicious reading is
Paul Ricoeur’s tracing of Althusser’s “hermeneutics of suspicion” to Marx, Freud, and
Nietzsche in Freud and Philosophy (30–37). In sociology, Latour has alighted on 1903 as the
crucial year in which Gabriel Tarde loses his debate with Émile Durkheim at the École
des Hautes Études Sociales, thus opening the door for Durkheim to found the discipline
of sociology on a concept of the social as a substance that sociologists discover underlying
the phenomenal world—a discipline-specific interpretive gesture from which Latour
seeks to free sociology. For a discussion of this debate, see Latour 13–15. For a reenactment of the debate itself, see <http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/354>.
4

Freedgood argues that late nineteenth-century forms of realism and the
reading practices they foster represent an extension of Marx’s concept of alienation,
particularly in the ways that both literary interpretation and commodity fetishism
bypass materiality in order to “get to . . . meaning or import or value.”
7
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As Rancière might put it, Wopsle’s storytelling presumes an “equality of intelligence” (Ignorant 50) where Jaggers’s explication posits an “inequality of knowledge”
(47).
9
It is worth noting that in another section of his introduction, “Theater Dethematized: Spatializations of the Novel,” Kurnick suggests a more formalist counterweight to the referential powers of the theater.
8
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